The Forty-Day War was not merely a military confrontation between Iran and the coalition composed of the United States and the Israeli regime; it also became a stage on which the region’s hidden realities were exposed. Many regional actors that had sought in recent years to present themselves as influential powers in West Asia were confronted in this major test with hard geopolitical realities. Among them, the United Arab Emirates holds a special position, a country that over the past two decades has sought, by relying on its economic wealth and strategic ties with Washington and Tel Aviv, to play a role in regional equations beyond its natural weight.

In recent years, Abu Dhabi’s rulers have assumed that they could compensate for their geopolitical and demographic limitations through external support. As a result, the UAE’s foreign policy gradually moved away from an approach based on regional cooperation and shifted toward participation in the security and political projects of extra-regional powers. From Libya and Sudan to Yemen and the Horn of Africa, traces of this policy can be observed. However, the Forty-Day War demonstrated that reliance on external actors does not necessarily create lasting security and influence.

One of the most important lessons of this war was that major powers support their allies when it serves their interests, and in critical moments, their priority is preserving their own interests rather than ensuring the security of regional partners. The experience of recent decades in West Asia has repeatedly confirmed this reality. At various points, the United States has shown that it is willing to sacrifice even its closest allies in response to strategic shifts and changing circumstances.

Nevertheless, it appears that part of the UAE’s political elite still believes that proximity to Washington and Tel Aviv can provide a form of strategic immunity. Security agreements, intelligence cooperation, and the normalization of relations with the Israeli regime can all be analyzed within this framework. Yet the Forty-Day War demonstrated that this calculation is not aligned with regional realities.

Throughout the war, one of the principal objectives of the United States and the Israeli regime was to alter the regional balance of power. They believed that by applying extensive military pressure, they could weaken Iran’s position and impose their preferred order on the region. Some regional actors also assumed that by aligning themselves with this project, they would gain a larger share of power and influence. However, the final outcome was quite different.

The failure of the war’s declared and undeclared objectives demonstrated that the region’s power structure is far more complex than can be reshaped through military operations or foreign alliances. This reality is especially significant for the UAE because a substantial part of its foreign policy in recent years has been based on the assumption that regional balances can be altered with the support of extra-regional actors.

Geography, however, has its own logic. The UAE is located in a region where its security depends above all on the stability of its surroundings. The country possesses neither extensive strategic depth, nor a large population, nor military capabilities comparable to those of the region’s principal powers. Much of the UAE’s strength is rooted in its economy, trade, investment, and transit role. Therefore, any widespread instability in the region can affect Abu Dhabi’s interests more severely than those of many other countries.

For this reason, tying the country’s future to tension-generating projects and foreign military alliances is not compatible with the UAE’s national interests in the long run. The experience of the Forty-Day War showed that any large-scale regional conflict can quickly affect economic security, energy, trade, and investment, the very sectors that constitute the pillars of the UAE’s power.

Another important point is that the Forty-Day War once again demonstrated that real power in West Asia does not stem solely from advanced military equipment or foreign backing. National will, indigenous capabilities, internal cohesion, and the ability to withstand external pressure remain among the most important components of power. Many calculations based on technological superiority or support from major powers were challenged during this war.

For the UAE, this reality should be regarded as a serious warning. A country whose security and stability are largely dependent on its surrounding environment cannot pursue confrontational policies indefinitely. The greater the gap between Abu Dhabi’s policies and the geopolitical realities of the region, the higher the costs of that gap will become. In recent years, signs of reassessment in certain aspects of the UAE’s foreign policy have become visible. Efforts to reduce tensions with some regional countries and expand economic relations with neighbors can be evaluated within this framework. Nevertheless, the Forty-Day War showed that this process requires greater depth and seriousness.

Sustainable security in the Persian Gulf is achieved not through foreign alliances but through cooperation among the countries of the region. Historical experience has also shown that the presence of extra-regional powers has generally complicated crises rather than reduced tensions. Whenever regional countries have been able to manage their differences through dialogue and cooperation, stability has increased and greater economic opportunities have emerged.

From a strategic perspective, the most important lesson of the Forty-Day War for the UAE is that security cannot be purchased. No arms contract, security agreement, or foreign support can replace stable and constructive relations with neighboring countries. States that build their security on artificial balances will face serious vulnerabilities when international conditions change.

Today, Abu Dhabi stands before an important choice. The first path is to continue policies that place it alongside extra-regional projects and inadvertently make it part of costly rivalries. The second path is to move toward regional cooperation, respect geopolitical realities, and invest in sustainable relations with neighboring countries.

The Forty-Day War demonstrated that the future of West Asia will be determined by the peoples of the region, not by external actors. Any country that recognizes this reality sooner will incur fewer costs and gain greater opportunities for development and stability. For the UAE, perhaps this is the most important message of the war: that a sustainable position in the region is achieved through cooperation and coexistence, not through attachment to projects whose fate is determined in distant capitals.

If Abu Dhabi’s rulers take this message seriously, the Forty-Day War could become the starting point for a strategic reassessment of the country’s foreign policy, a reassessment that would benefit not only the UAE but also the stability and security of the entire region.

MNA

Mohammad Amin Tavakolizadeh, Vice Mayor of Tehran for Social and Cultural Affairs, announced the prediction of a three-day program for the funeral of the martyred Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, saying, “People will be able to attend the funeral ceremony during this period, and the final details of the place for this ceremony will be announced soon.”

Tavakolizadeh stated, “Three days have been planned for the funeral of the martyred Imam, so that people can attend his body and perform the funeral ceremony. The venue for this ceremony will most likely be the Tehran [Imam Khomeini] Mossalla (Grand Mosque) or the Maseluem of Imam Khomeini, which is scheduled to be finalized and announced later today.”

He added: “After this stage, prayers will be performed and then the funeral ceremony will be held, and it is predicted that if all goes well, the funeral ceremony in Tehran will last at least 24 hours.”

Tehran’s vice mayor continued: “After Tehran, the ceremony will follow in Qom and then in Mashhad. Also, according to the will and recommendations of relatives, the burial place of the martyred Imam will be next to the holy shrine of Imam Reza (AS).”

He also said that the funeral procession will be held in the next two weeks.

MNA

In a phone call with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Ghalibaf, who chairs Iran’s negotiating team in the Pakistan-mediated talks with Washington, said the bond between Iran and Lebanon is unbreakable. “Our lives and yours are one,” he said.

“Any agreement to end the war between Iran and the US will include a cessation of attacks on all fronts, especially Lebanon,” Ghalibaf said.

He added that over the past two days Iran has been pursuing an end to Israeli attacks against Lebanon “with seriousness,” and warned, “If the crimes continue, we will not only stop the negotiation process but will stand against the Zionist regime.”

Berri, for his part, thanked Iran for its efforts to halt Israeli crimes, saying Lebanon will never forget Tehran’s positive positions at this critical stage.

The call comes as Israeli strikes have intensified across southern Lebanon, killing and wounding scores and displacing hundreds of thousands, according to Lebanese officials. Iran has repeatedly condemned the attacks and called the US an accomplice.

MNA

The Quds Force Commander Major General Esmaeil Ghaani wrote in a post on X on Monday that, “The evil acts of the Zionists in Lebanon and Gaza, which come under the shameless support from America, will strngthen the Axis of Resistance’s will to expand support to both fronts, and take action to activate other fronts, and link the traffic situation of the Bab al-Mandab Strait with that of the Strait of Hormuz.”

“The miserable Zionist regime must know that the simultaneous crimes in southern Lebanon and Gaza will drag it in the quagmire of Hezbollah operations and the renewed [al-Aqsa] Storm of Palestinian youth,” General Ghaani also wrote.

MNA

In the fast-paced developments of West Asia, sometimes a brief event can reveal a major reality. The story of the Zionist regime’s threat of a large-scale attack on Beirut’s southern suburbs and its sudden retreat following Iran’s warnings is one such event, an incident that once again showed that war-mongering actors such as the United States and the Zionist regime respond, above all else, to the language of power, deterrence, and cost imposition.

In recent hours, the Zionist regime, intensifying its threats against Lebanon, called on residents of certain areas in Beirut’s southern suburbs to evacuate their homes, and Israeli media reported readiness to carry out a large-scale attack. The atmosphere in the region was rapidly moving toward a new confrontation, and many observers expected Tel Aviv to once again ignite the flames of war in Lebanon.

But just when everything seemed set for a new attack to begin, the equation suddenly changed. The phone call between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, and then the release of news about the operation being halted, raised an important question for the public: What happened that caused a decision of this magnitude to change within a few hours?

The answer must be sought in the clear and explicit messages sent by Iran. Tehran made it unmistakably clear that the existing ceasefire is not confined to a single front and that any action against Lebanon could be considered a violation of existing agreements. At the same time, military warnings were also conveyed, warnings that indicated any new aggression would not be without cost and that the scope of responses could extend beyond Tel Aviv’s initial calculations.

This reveals an important reality. Contrary to the image that Western media sometimes present of the United States and the Zionist regime, the decision-makers of these two actors operate not on the basis of moral principles, international law, or humanitarian considerations, but on a cost-benefit calculation. They launch attacks when they believe the other side lacks the capability or will to respond, and they retreat when they seriously assess the likelihood of incurring heavy costs.

A look at the history of developments in the region confirms this same pattern. From Lebanon to Gaza, from Syria to Iraq, whenever there has been a power vacuum or a weakness in deterrence, the war machines of the United States and the Zionist regime have become more active.

But whenever they have faced effective resistance, retaliatory capability, and the will to confront, they have changed their calculations. In other words, what prevents war is not diplomatic promises, but the fear of the costs of war.

Trump’s recent behavior can also be analyzed within this same framework. A president who has repeatedly spoken of a policy of “peace through strength” believes in the logic of power more than perhaps any other politician. In the international arena, he has repeatedly shown that he sees negotiation not as a tool for mutual understanding, but as a tool for imposing will. From this perspective, it is natural that he would only step back from escalating tensions when he sees a deterrent power facing him.

On the other hand, Benjamin Netanyahu has also repeatedly attempted in recent years to turn foreign crises into a tool for solving domestic problems. The prime minister of the Zionist regime knows full well that war and insecurity can divert public attention from domestic political, security, and social crises. Nevertheless, even he is forced to retreat when he seriously sees the possibility of the conflict widening and costs increasing.

For this reason, the halting of the attack on Beirut cannot be attributed solely to mediation or diplomatic contacts. Diplomacy is effective when it is backed by power. Experience has shown that negotiation without power leads, at best, to hollow promises and, at worst, encourages the other side to increase pressure and make greater demands. What proved effective in the recent incident was the understanding by Washington and Tel Aviv that continuing along that path could bring consequences beyond their expectations.

This event also carries an important message for Lebanon. The Lebanese government has, in recent years, repeatedly tried to prevent Zionist regime aggressions through diplomatic mechanisms and international mediation. But experience shows that guaranteeing national security is not possible solely by relying on foreign promises.

Great powers defend the rights of countries when their interests dictate it, and when other interests are at stake, they ignore even the most blatant acts of aggression.

Therefore, what guarantees Lebanon’s security is not international statements or guarantees from foreign powers, but the creation and maintenance of a deterrence equation, an equation in which the enemy reaches the conclusion that the cost of aggression will outweigh its benefits. Only under such conditions does the likelihood of war diminish and lasting stability take shape.

The incident in Beirut’s southern suburbs proved once again that in the turbulent environment of West Asia, power remains the most important variable determining actors’ behavior. The retreat of Trump and Netanyahu from an attack that had advanced to the brink of execution was not the result of a sudden change in their views on peace and stability, but the product of a change in their calculations regarding the costs of military action.

The main lesson of this event is clear: in facing actors with a long record of war-mongering, occupation, and violating international law, relying on good faith is not enough. What can prevent the outbreak of war is creating balance, demonstrating resolve, and maintaining deterrence power.

The Beirut experience once again showed that when the cost of aggression rises, even the most hardline politicians are forced to retreat, because ultimately, they understand the language of power better than any other language.

MNA